It would serve as a winter port to Newchwang for the greater part of the winter, as Chinwangtao does to Tien-tsin, and enable much cargo from the neighbourhood of Mukden to reach the sea-board for immediate export instead of being stored till the spring, as at present.
As to the works that would be required to make the port a success, the most important of all would, of course, be a breakwater to give the necessary shelter to enable the ships to use the port both in winter and summer.
It should be designed to give the greatest amount of shelter to as large an area of deep water as possible at all seasons. It should have sufficient width to accommodate all the railway and steamer traffic likely to be required. It should be built in the nature of a pier, that is, vertical on both sides, so that ships could draw up to either side of it, as most convenient, so that in winter time, in the event of the enclosed water being frozen, steamers could still make use of the outside, which could not be done in summer owing to the south-west winds prevailing at that season.
It should be built of concrete, or reinforced concrete, so as to avoid the after expense of renewals and repairs.
Also a branch railway will be required, joining the Imperial Chinese railways either at Lienshan or Kaochiao; probably the latter place would be selected as avoiding the heavy gradients on the main line to Lienshan. This would be a question to be decided by the engineers of that railway, and it would be advisable to ask the Imperial Chinese Railway Administration to order the necessary surveys and estimates to be prepared by their staff at once.
The accompanying plan* shows the lines of the breakwater which I would advise to be constructed. It would enclose sufficient space for the requirements of merchant ships, and could also be used for refitting men-of-war. The depth of the water at the entrance—380 feet at low tide—would be enough for any war-ship or merchant vessel.
It is located so as to give complete shelter on the inside against all winds, and, since it would be vertical on both sides, ships could use the outside in winter in the event of the enclosed water freezing owing to its being sheltered. The entrance would be sufficiently wide to allow the north-west winds to clear out drift ice, as I have already explained. The break-water would be wide enough to allow all necessary railway traffic to be conducted along it, and its length—5,000 feet—would be ample for fourteen ordinary steamers to lie alongside, and as many more could be at anchor within its shelter. Junks and native craft could be accommodated in great numbers and discharged or loaded from platforms which could be built along the north side. The port as it is designed could thus serve the double purpose of a naval port and a commercial harbour.
Any necessary docks, &c., could be afterwards cut out of the rock on its north and west sides.
As regards the cost, it is of course difficult to say positively till borings have been made to discover the nature of the sea bottom. We know that the surface is covered with soft mud, but before making a final design for the structure of the break-water it is necessary to know how deep that mud extends, and whether rock or other substance lies beneath it. If rock should be close to surface, it would require a different kind of structure to what would be necessary if it should be deep down. But, roughly speaking, such a break-water would probably cost about 80l. per foot in length, or, say, 400,000l. It would take some five or six years to complete, but part of it could be in working order after two years.
I have, &c.
(Signed)
WILLOUGHBY R. HUGHES, M.I.C.E.
0
* Not printed.
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.1676
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[41495]
No. 1.
[November 28.]
SECTION 3.
0.0
47047
Rec
X
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received November 28.) (No. 151.) Sir,
Peking, October 14, pops 23 DEC 08 WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of my despatch NO Confidential, of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you copy of a despatch from Mr. Willis, Acting British Consul-General at Mukden, in which he expresses his views as to the possibility of finding a satisfactory compromise of the Harbin Railway Settlement question.
An international settlement would apparently be attended with great practical difficulties, but seems to be the only arrangement that Mr. Willis can suggest as at all likely to afford a way out of the present impasse at Harbin. The Chinese would, of course, prefer to repurchase the land, but that idea is, as Mr. Willis points out, impracticable, and I agree with him in thinking that an international settlement would constitute an important precedent in support of the principle of equal opportunity in Manchuria generally.
I have, &c. (Signed)
Inclosure in No. 1.
Acting Consul-General Willis to Sir J. Jordan.
J. N. JORDAN.
(No. 69. Confidential.) Sir,
Mukden, October 9, 1908. I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 29, Confidential, of the 2nd instant, in which you request to be furnished with my observations on the last paragraph of your despatch No. 432, to Sir Edward Grey.
My despatch, No. 61 of the 26th ultimo, which crossed your despatch under acknowledgment, will have acquainted you with my general view of the situation at Harbin, and with the difficulties in the way of finding a satisfactory solution.
The possibility of a compromise on the lines you suggested to M. Korostovetz has, I think, occurred to the Chinese authorities. Mr. Sze and later his Excellency M. T. Liang have both pointed out to me in conversation that under any fair interpretation of the 1896 Agreement the acquisition of land by the Chinese Eastern Railway Company would be restricted to land bona fide required for railway purposes, and to this the Chinese Government could, of course, offer no objection.
A recognition of this principle by the Russian Government would strengthen the hands of the Chinese in the event of future protests against the Japanese Railway settlements, the areas of which, considered as land necessary for the use of the railway, are, similarly with the Harbin settlement, inconsistent with the spirit of the original Agreement.
It would, however, be a matter of great practical difficulty, considering the diversity of the railway interests and the extent of the settlement to demarcate a reasonable area for the exclusive use of the railway at Harbin; for example, the offices of the Railway Administration are more than a mile from the railway station, whilst the wharves for the Company's river steamers are at least two miles distant in the opposite direction. Unfortunately at the moment I am without a map of Harbin, and unable from personal recollection to give detailed arguments in support of this view; the objection had, however, evidently occurred to Mr. Sze.
I recently asked Mr. Liang what he thought of the possibility of turning Harbin into an international settlement, to which he replied that in his opinion the great objection to this course, even if such a solution could be used as a precedent to regularize the South Manchurian Railway settlements, would be that no foreigners but Russians and Japanese would reside in such settlements, and the Chinese Government would be for all practical purposes in the same position as before.
تحانات قال الحماية من العمل الالم الاتصال
4
It would serve as a winter port to Newchwang for the greater part of the winter, as Chinwangtao does to Tien-tsin, and enable much cargo from the neighbourhood of Mukden to reach the sea-board for immediate export instead of being stored till the spring, as at present.
As to the works that would be required to make the port a success, the most important of all would, of course, be a breakwater to give the necessary shelter to enable the ships to use the port both in winter and summer.
It should be designed
to give the greaqest amount of shelter to as large an area of deep water as possible at all seasons. It should have sufficient width to accommodate all the railway and steamer traffic likely to be required. It should be built in the nature of a pier, that is, vertical on both sides, so that ships could draw up to either side of it, as most convenient, so that in winter time, in the event of the inclosed water being frozen, steamers could still make use of the outside, which could not be done in summer owing to the south-west winds prevailing at that season.
It should be built of concrete, or reinforced concrete, so as to avoid the after expense of renewals and repairs.
Also a branch railway will be required, joining the Imperial Chinese railways either at Lienshan or Kaochiao; probably the latter place would be selected as avoiding the heavy gradients on the main line to Lieushan. This would be a question to be decided by the engineers of that railway, and it would be advisable to ask the Imperial Chinese Railway Administration to order the necessary surveys and estimates to be prepared by their staff at once.
The accompanying plan* shows the lines of the breakwater which I would advise to be constructed. It would inclose sufficient space for the requirements of merchant ships, and could also be used for refitting men-of-war. The depth of the water at the entrance-380 feet at low tide--would be enough for any war-ship or merchant vessel.
It is located so as to give complete shelter on the inside against all winds, and, since it would be vertical on both sides, ships could use the outside in winter in the event of the inclosed water freezing owing to its being sheltered. The entrance would be sufficiently wide to allow the north-west winds to clear out drift ice, as I have already explained. The break-water would be wide enough to allow all necessary railway traffic to be conducted along it, and its length-5,000 feet-would be ample for fourteen ordinary steamers to lie alongside, and as many more could be at anchor within its shelter. Junks and native craft could be accommodated in great numbers and discharged or loaded from platforms which could be built along the north side. The port as it is designed could thus serve the double purpose of a naval port and a commercial harbour,
Any necessary docks, &c., could be afterwards cut out of the rock on its north and west sides.
As regards the cost, it is of course difficult to say positively till borings have been inade to discover the nature of the sea bottom. We know that the surface is covered with soft mud, but before making a final design for the structure of the break-water it is necessary to know how deep that mud extends, and whether rock or other substance lies beneath it. If rock should be close to surface, it would require a different kind of structure to what would be necessary if it should be deep down. But, roughly speaking, such a break-water would probably cost about 80%. per foot in length, or, say, 400,0001. It would take some five or six years to complete, but part of it could be in working order after two years.
I have, &c.
(Signed)
WILLOUGHBY R. HUGHES, M.I.C.E.
0
* Not printed.
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.1676
พ
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[41495]
No. 1.
[November 28.]
SECTION 3.
0.0
47047
Rec
X
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.-(Received November 28.) (No. 151.) Sir,
Peking, October 14, pops 23 DEC 08 WITH reference to the concluding paragraph of my despatch
NO Confidential, of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you copy of a despatch from Mr. Willis, Acting British Consul-General at Mukden, in which he expresses his views as to the possibility of finding a satisfactory compromise of the Harbin Railway Settlement question.
An international settlement would apparently be attended with great practical difficulties, but seems to be the only arrangement that Mr. Willis can suggest as at all likely to afford a way out of the present impasse at Harbin. The Chinese would, of course, prefer to repurchase the land, but that idea is, as Mr. Willis points out, impracticable, and I agree with him in thinking that an international settlement would constitute an important precedent in support of the principle of equal opportunity in Manchuria generally.
I have, &c. (Signed)
Inclosure in No. 1.
Acting Consul-General Willis to Sir J. Jordan.
J. N. JORDAN.
(No. 69. Confidential.) Sir,
Mukden, October 9, 1908. I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 29, Confidential, of the 2nd instant, in which you request to be furnished with my observations on the last paragraph of your despatch No. 432, to Sir Edward Grey.
My despatch, No. 61 of the 26th ultimo, which crossed your despatch under acknowledgment, will have acquainted you with my general view of the situation at Harbin, and with the difficulties in the way of finding a satisfactory solution.
The possibility of a compromise on the lines you suggested to M. Korostovetz has, I think, occurred to the Chinese authorities. Mr. Sze and later his Excellency M. T. Liang have both pointed out to me in conversation that uuder any fair inter- pretation of the 1896 Agreement the acquisition of land by the Chinese Eastern Railway Company would be restricted to land bona fide required for railway purposes, and to this the Chinese Government could, of course, offer no objection.
A recognition of this principle by the Russian Government would strengthen the hands of the Chinese in the event of future protests against the Japanese Railway settlements, the areas of which, considered as land necessary for the use of the railway, are, similarly with the Harbin settlement, inconsistent with the spirit of the original Agreement.
It would, however, be a matter of great practical difficulty, considering the diversity of the railway interests and the extent of the settlement to demarcate a reasonable area for the exclusive use of the railway at Harbin; for example, the offices of the Railway Administration are more than a mile from the railway station, whilst the wharves for the Company's river steamers are at least two miles distant in the opposite direction. Unfortunately at the moment I am without a map of Harbin, and unable from personal recollection to give detailed arguments in support of this view; the objection had, however, evidently occurred to Mr. Sze.
I recently asked Mr. Liang what he thought of the possibility of turning Harbin into an international settlement, to which he replied that in his opinion the great objection to this course, even if such a solution could be used as a precedent to regularize the South Manchurian Railway settlements, would be that no foreigners but Russians and Japanese would reside in such settlements, and the Chinese Government would be for all practical purposes in the saine position as before. I
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